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In Economics After the Crisis , Adair Turner writes that the crisis of 2008-2009 should
prompt a wide set of challenges to economic and political assumptions and to economic
theory. Turner argues that the faults of theory and policy that led to the crisis were integral
elements within a broader set of simplistic beliefs about the objectives and means of economic
activity that dominated policy thinking for several decades. Reviewed by Alastair Hill.
Economics After The Crisis: Objectives and Means. Adair Turner. MIT Press. April
2012.
 
With the Deputy Governor of  the Bank of  England Paul Tucker ’s hopes of
assuming the top job at Threadneedle Street signif icantly dented having
been embroiled in the recent LIBOR scandal, many now see Lord Adair
Turner, the current Chairman of  the Financial Services Authority, as the
f ront-runner. Yet despite being f ormer vice-chairman of  US bank Merrill
Lynch and an ex-Mckinsey consultant, his appointment as the Bank’s next
Governor would likely make many in the City rather uneasy. Taking up his
role as Chairman of  the f inancial services industry in 2008, Lord Turner
has since made clear his views on the practices and structure of  the
f inancial industry, and spared litt le when crit icising the policy-makers and
polit icians who presided over this culture. Most sensationally back in
August 2009 Lord Turner made a stunning attack on the f inancial services
industry, saying that it had grown too big, and much of  what it now does is
“socially useless”. He also backed taxes on banks as a way to tackle the
city’s excessive bonus culture, as well as lending tacit support to plans f or a Tobin Tax if  increased capital
requirements are insuf f icient.
Of ten dismissed as a f ashionable lef t ie by his crit ics, Lord Turner ’s swif t departure f rom the ‘light touch
regulation’ rhetoric of  his predecessors towards a much more interventionist tone is sometimes easily
dismissed by many on the right. However, in his newly published book, which brings together the three
Lionel Robbins lectures he delivered at the London School of  Economics in October 2010, Lord Turner
cements his posit ion as one of  f ew Brit ish public intellectuals who has given serious thought to our current
economic predicament, and more f undamentally, what it means f or the academic discipline of  economics
itself .
Central to these lectures is a rejection of  the pre-crisis economic orthodoxy of  neo-classical economics
which saw as its objective the maximisation of  growth, assuming a direct link between per capita income
and welf are. As a means to this it saw the loosely regulated expansion of  f inancial markets. In contrast,
Lord Turner ’s f irst two chapters question these objectives and means respectively, bef ore his third chapter
builds recommendations f or policy-makers and academic economists alike.
Lord Turner ’s f irst chapter looks at the conventional emphasis of  maximising growth in pre-crash f inancial
policy making. “This shared assumption across the polit ical spectrum was that economic growth – both in
GDP and in per capita GDP – would result directly in increasing well-being, welf are, happiness, or whatever
word we use”. Against this, Lord Turner argues that there is simply not the empirical evidence to support
word we use”. Against this, Lord Turner argues that there is simply not the empirical evidence to support
this assumption, arguing that in developed Western economies the empirical evidence would suggest that
we cannot be conf ident GDP growth will necessarily deliver signif icant and sustained increases in welf are.
Part of  the reason f or this f ailure to deliver any increases in welf are is to do with changing production
activity. Based on Roger Bootle’s distinction between distributive and creative activit ies, Lord Turner
asserts that much production activity in modern economies is now distributive, in that rather than creating
new wealth, it simply re-allocates resources between two parties. For example, the f inancial trader who bets
well makes money at the expense of  the one who bets badly. While most activity in modern economies is
partly distributive, and partly creative writes, however Lord Turner notes that in more developed societies
the propensity f or highly able individuals to become engaged in zero-sum distributive activit ies vastly
increases.
A f inal and related point in this section is the issue of  inequality. In the dominant economic discourses a
high level of  inequality was seen as acceptable on the basis that it allowed a lightly regulated market
economy to f lourish and deliver f aster increases in GDP growth. In contrast Lord Turner highlights that in
developed societies with increasing levels of  distributive activity much wealth is concentrated at the top,
with litt le of  the so-called ‘trickle-down ef f ect’. He suggests that not only are average incomes not
signif icantly increasing, but also that “inequality can be a major cause of  anxiety and unhappiness that no
amount of  growth can dispel”.
In his second chapter Lord Turner looks at the means used to achieve this aim of  constantly increasing
growth, namely f ree and lightly regulated f inancial markets. Such policy-making was inf ormed by a dominant
economic discourse which saw all economic actors as inherently rational, and viewed widespread growth
and intensif ication of  f inancial markets as a posit ive development, in that it increased both ef f iciency and in
hindsight rather absurdly; their stability. Under the neoclassical model, the vast increase of  credit
derivatives and structured credit markets over the last two decades was seen as delivering greater price
transparency which delivers greater market ef f iciency and took us closer to the ef f iciency maximising
equilibrium. In other words, the intensif ication of  f inancial activity and new and increasingly complex
f inancial products were lauded as making markets more ef f icient, and by pooling and dispersing risk, as
increasing f inancial stability. While there was a counter-discourse in the academy building on Keynes and
Minsky’s notion of  inherent uncertainty and that f inancial markets can be subject “to self  reinf orcing swings
of  irrational exuberance and then despair”, it was largely ignored.
While Keynes wrote f amously that “practical men, who believes themselves to be quite exempt f rom any
intellectual inf luence, are usually the salves of  some def unct economist”, Lord Turner suggested that in
f act recent decades have been characterised by very able individuals in policy-making, Government,
regulatory bodies, and risk-management departments in Banks who instead actively gravitated to a highly
technical and mathematical discipline of  economics which of f ered them apparent certainty. With the advent
of  the f inancial crisis such certainty has clearly been disproved he concludes f rom his f irst two lectures.
In his third chapter he asserts that there are clear lessons must be learnt f rom the recent crisis. On a more
instrumental level he suggests that inequality should be recognised as a polit ical issue, and not just ignored
in f avour of  considerations of  economic ef f iciency. Secondly he asserts that we should aim to counteract
“any large and obvious tendencies f or prolif eration of  purely distributive activit ies”. It is clearly on these
considerations that Lord Turner ’s comments on city bonuses and “socially useless activity” are built upon.
Alongside these more instrumental considerations, Lord Turner also illustrates that he has thought
extensively about what the recent crisis means f or the discipline of  economics itself . His conclusion is
particularly reminiscent of  an article which still sticks vividly in my mind by Antole Kaletsky back in 2009, in
which Kaletsky asserted that “not only have economists f ailed to guide the world out of  the f inancial crisis,
they were also primarily responsible f or leading us into it. Either economics has to be abandoned as an
academic discipline – or it must undergo an intellectual revolution”.
In answering this challenge, Lord Turner agrees with the suggestions of  Robert Skidelsky that there is an
urgent case not to jett ison economics as an academic discipline, but to reconstruct it. A major def iciency in
the prevailing conventional wisdom in the strand of  economics which has dominated in the last two decades
has been that it is overly technical, overly mathematical and sees all markets as entirely ef f icient and all
actors as entirely rational, he asserts. Borrowing Skidelsky’s insights, Lord Turner suggests that
“economics should return to the wider f ocus on Smith, Hume, Ricardo and Keynes” and to treat the world
as we see it, including its imperf ections. Post crisis we need to recognise that economic policy choices are
polit ical rather than narrowly economic in nature, he concludes. The problem in the pre-crisis years was that
policy-makers f ollowed a dominant discourse of  economics which was not only beyond polit ical
questioning, but which also ult imately proved to be f alse in its observations of  how the world actually
works.
——————————————————————————————-
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